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Climate finance and peace—tackling the climate and 
humanitarian crisis
2021’s Conference of Parties, the 26th UN Climate 
Change Conference of Parties (COP26), is crucially 
important as governments—for the first time since the 
Paris Agreement—are expected to agree on concrete 
commitments and greater ambitions to limit global 
warming to 1·5°C. COP26 President-Designate Alok 
Sharma stated that delivery of US$100 billion in climate 
finance is going to be the key to whether the goals 
of COP26 succeed or fail. At the same time, people 
worldwide have started acknowledging the impacts 
of the climate crisis on peace and security—otherwise 
called the climate security nexus.1,2 The concern then 
becomes where and how objectives and investments in 
adaptation and peacebuilding can be aligned, and how 
trade-offs between climate finance, peace, and security 
can be minimised or avoided. 
An overlay of adaptation potential and the Global 
Peace Index (appendix pp 1–7) shows that most of 
the low-income countries in tropical areas experience 
a combination of peacebuilding and adaptation 
challenges, and, only in very few countries, one 
or the other priority dominates clearly (figure). In 
other words, most of the low-income countries in 
tropical areas are exposed and vulnerable to climate 
change, and these countries are also prone to fragility 
due to insecurity and conflict. Globally, 355 million 
households (about 1·3 billion people) are exposed to 
climate hazards and are, thus, in need of climate change 
adaptation; 40% of those (142 million households, or 
527 million people) are in conflict-prone and fragile-
prone areas. Furthermore, the number of households 
exposed to climate hazards is about six times greater 
in conflict-prone areas compared with more peaceful 
areas. The greatest opportunities to align adaptation 
and peacebuilding objectives and finance exist in 
Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Philippines, Myanmar, and 
India. These countries have Global Peace Index values 
ranging from 2·4 to 3·4, and the number of climate-
exposed households are in the range of 2·1 million to 
11·4 million, with the exception of India, which has 
79 million climate-exposed households. Besides these 
countries, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Niger, Zimbabwe, 
and Chad also show substantial opportunities to 
address both climate adaptation and peacebuilding, 
with Global Peace Index values above 2·4, but 












Figure: Overlay of adaptation potential and the Global Peace Index 
Adaptation potential assumes investments in agricultural adaptation are prioritised in areas where rural households are exposed to climate hazards. Global Peace 
Index measures the relative position of countries’ peacefulness (a lower index indicates higher peacefulness). Grey indicates low adaptation potential and low index. 
Shades of green show increasing index values (light to dark green, over the x-axis of the colour scale); shades of blue show increasing adaptation potential (light to 
dark blue, over the y-axis of the colour scale). The top-right corner of the colour scale shows the combination of high adaptation potential and high index.
See Online for appendix
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beneficiaries, ranging from 1 million to 2 million 
households per country (appendix pp 2–6).
Despite opportunities for action, climate finance 
has yet to be leveraged in a way that maximises 
synergies between climate adaptation and peace 
and produces the optimum co-benefits. Currently, 
adaptation investments insufficiently target countries 
at substantial risk of climate-driven instability and 
conflict. Notably, only two out of the top ten global 
recipients of adaptation finance—Niger and Ethiopia—
are highly exposed to climate hazards and marked by 
low levels of peacefulness. The Green Climate Fund, 
the main climate funder to developing countries, has 
recently taken measures to address this imbalance and 
has approved four new projects to implement climate 
action in fragile states. This measure brings the total 
number of Green Climate Fund adaptation projects 
in fragile and conflict-affected contexts to 12 out of 
63 projects globally.3 Although a growing focus is being 
given to fragile and crisis settings, climate funding 
still supports siloed responses and solutions that are 
not conflict-sensitive and context-sensitive.4 Conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding objectives are rarely 
featured in adaptation programming and, currently, 
very few projects promote integrated approaches to 
climate and conflict risks.5  
If designed and implemented without consideration 
for conflict situations, adaptation strategies can 
inadvertently reinforce existing conflict dynamics 
or create new ones.6 Adaption measures that do not 
consider conflict situations can indirectly increase 
conflict potential by affecting economic performances, 
undermining political stability, or fostering social 
inequalities and grievances.7 For instance, the Salma 
Dam project in Afghanistan has intensified group 
marginalisation and resource competition in the Zinda 
Jan district by restricting access to the shared water 
supply.8 These adaptation strategies ultimately result 
in negative feedback that precludes development 
and sustainable peace under a changing climate. 
Adaptation can therefore increase the risk and severity 
of conflict, and related socioeconomic costs can hinder 
adaptation efforts. 
However, a conflict-sensitive approach to adaptation 
might avoid an outbreak or a relapse of conflict 
and even facilitate building and sustaining peace, 
especially at the local level.9 The project by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the UN in Abyei, South 
Sudan, is an example of a conflict-sensitive approach 
to adaptation. The provision of community-based 
animal health services to both the Dinka Ngok and 
the Misseriya communities increased dialogue and 
trust between these conflicting ethnic groups, thereby 
reducing resource-related conflicts and facilitating 
peace.10 Thus, to prevent harmful impacts of adaptation, 
climate finance and adaptation programming should 
at a minimum apply the principle of do no harm, 
which includes promoting resilience and livelihood-
based solutions without creating further tensions and 
conflicts. 
Public finance actors, such as the Green Climate 
Fund, the Global Environmental Facility, and the 
Adaptation Fund, can and should directly contribute 
to peace and stability and address drivers of conflict, 
reinforce peace drivers, and where possible contribute 
to sustaining peace. At a minimum, conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding objectives must be included in the 
environmental and social safeguards. A more proactive 
peacebuilding approach would be to increase funds 
to tackle national and transboundary natural resource 
management issues that are at the root cause of 
conflict, while, for example, also delivering technologies 
that increase water use-efficiency at the local level. It is 
also crucial to ease entry barriers for fragile and conflict-
affected countries, which are often automatically 
excluded from most common climate funds due to the 
scarcity of historical data to support their applications. 
At policy level, guidelines are needed to align adaptation 
and peacebuilding efforts from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change National 
Communications, and National Adaptation Plans. CGIAR 
and other academic institutions must actively support 
finance actors to mainstream climate security analysis 
and programming guidelines into daily operations.
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